


Wireless Nets Vulnerable



David Clements

Cyrus Hall

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Outline

- Wireless Nets are pervasive
- Wireless Nets are vulnerable to threats
- Definition of WEP
- Attacks on WEP
- Drive-by results and Tools
- Securing Wireless Nets
- References


Wireless Nets are Everywhere

- Walk around the neighborhood - 4 nets in 5min
- Downtown, 50 nets in 4 hours
- 80% - 90% wide open
- \$60 - \$70 Cards selling like hotcakes
- Access Points - \$100 - \$150

Threats

- **Loss of Confidentiality**
 - Competitors
 - Thieves
 - Disruptors
- **Identity Hijack**
 - Bad guys cause trouble on Internet as you
- **Disruption of Company Functionality**
 - Viruses
 - Trojan Horse
 - Data Integrity

Typical Wireless Deployment



Definitions

- 802.11b (aka. WiFi)
 - 11 Mbits/sec (actually 5 Mbits/sec data throughput)
 - Access Point – gateway to wired network
 - 11 channels
 - 2.4 GHz, 25 MHz per channel
- Active / Passive attacks

Wireless Range (802.11b)

- On card antennas: up to hundreds of feet
- Pair of yagi's – 10 miles for line-of-sight
- Type of walls biggest factor affecting range

Wired Equivalence Privacy (WEP)

- Yield privacy same as hard wire nets
- For 802.11b, two levels of encryptions:
 - 40-bit key (aka, silver, 64-bit)
 - 104-bit key (aka, gold, 128-bit)
- Encryption based on key and Initialization Vector
- IVs taken from 2^{24} range
- IV is transmitted clear; key is not transmitted

WEP Security Goals

- Confidentiality – prevent eavesdropping
- Access control – who can use the net
- Data integrity – can packets be altered?

WEP's Crypto Mistakes

- WEP uses CRC for integrity
 - Need to use Message Digests for integrity
- WEP reuses cipher streams
 - Never reuse a cipher stream
- WEP uses partial key space
 - Use all available bits

General Encryption

Plaintext	Hello World	1011000100111
Keystream	\oplus	1000000010001
Cypherstream		0011111111110


802.11b WEP Encryption

- Give everyone in a group the same key
- For every packet to be transmitted, choose IV
- IVs are integers from 0 to 2^{24}
- cypherstream \leftarrow RC4(IV • key)
- cyphertext \leftarrow plaintext \oplus cypherstream
- Transmitted packet \leftarrow Hdr • IV • cyphertext

Key Generation

- 104 bits: 110010100010100001001010111...
- Hex: 0x 1234567890123ABCDEF0123456
- Key generator
 - Passphrase: boobar129\$\$Z
 - Yields 104 bits, i.e. MD5, etc

WEP Encrypted Packet




$$C = (M \cdot \text{chk}(M) \oplus \text{RC4}(\text{IV}_i \cdot \text{key}))$$


Attacks on WEP

- Exhaustive search of 2^{21} (30 seconds)
- Exhaustive search of 2^{40} (45 days)
- Dictionary attack - 1M words per minute
- Weak IVs (2hrs for 40bit; 8 hours for 104 bit)
- IV tables
- Packet Altering

Wardriving (USA)




Wardriving (Denver)



<http://www.athomeprd.com/~jimb/wardriving/index.html>

Wardriving (Boulder)



Wardriving Tools

- Stumblers
 - Netstumbler (Windows) www.netstumbler.com
 - dstumbler (BSD) www.dachb0den.com
- Capture and Crack utilities
 - airsnort (linux) www.airsnort.shmoo.com
 - bsd-airtools (BSD) www.dachb0den.com
 - prism2ctl , dstumbler , dwepdump , dwepcrack

dstumbler

- Used to find Wireless Networks
- Works with Prism2 and Hermes Cards
- Detects WEP on/off
- Detects default settings

dstumbler Screenshot

```

mobiledig
[ 6] Wireless (00:30:ab:07:b0:30)d w000:000:000 a SSID: Apple Network 31b78
[ 1] Apple Network 31b78c (00:02:2d:31:b7:8c) n000:000:000 r c
[ 6] linksys (00:04:5a:fa:47:7f)d n000:000:000 o BSSID: 00:02:2d:31:b7:8c
[10] arg (00:02:2d:21:ac:1b)d n000:000:000 i Mfg: Agere-Lucent
[ 1] ORC (00:30:65:1d:02:f0) w000:000:000 c Channel: 1
[11] BRUCEfirsttry1 (00:40:96:41:96:05) w000:000:000 m Signal/Noise: 0/0/0
[ 6] rund0 (00:40:05:de:e6:b0) n000:000:000 First Seen: 19:4:44 Last4

000:027:027 -----
012:039:027 ++++++
009:036:027 +++++
000:027:027 -----
009:036:027 +++++
000:027:027 -----
000:027:027 -----
003:030:027 +
000:027:027 -----
015:042:027 +++++++
000:027:027 -----
003:030:027 +
006:033:027 +++
006:033:027 +++
000:027:027 -----
000:027:027 -----
000:027:027 -----
027:054:027 ++++++++
030:057:027 ++++++++
018:045:027 ++++++++
015:042:027 ++++++++
030:057:027 ++++++++
030:057:027 ++++++++
039:066:027 ++++++++
024:051:027 ++++++++
021:048:027 ++++++++
012:039:027 +++++
033:060:027 ++++++++
000:027:027 -----
000:027:027 -----
000:027:027 -----
009:036:027 +++++

[ basic navigation ]-----
[+/-]: ap up/down
[</>]: node up/down
[w/d]: page ap up/down
[e/h]: end/home
[n/s]: newest/sort
[a/r]: autosel/resolve
[o/i]: nodes/audio
[m/k]: menu/refresh
[c/.]: chanlock/comment

[ file commands ]-----
[l/b]: load/backup
[q]: quit

```

dweepdump

- Used to gather packets
- Works with Prism2 cards
- Passive Sniffing
- Use it in 104 bit or 40 bit mode
- Used for weak KSA attack (60 packets)

dwepcrack

- Used to retrieve encryption keys
- 21-bit attack
- Dictionary attack
- Weak KSA attack

How to secure Wireless

- Treat 802.11b as external (outside firewall)
- 802.11x
- Vendors (non-standard, Cisco, Agere)
- Secure services: SSL, SSH, IMAP/S
- IPsec
- Use 104-bit keys and change frequently

References

- **Borisov, Goldberg, Wagner**

- Intercepting Mobile Security of the WEP Algorithm.
<http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html>

- **Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir**

- Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4
http://www.eyetap.org/~rguerra/toronto2001/rc4_ksaproc.pdf

- **Stubblefield, Ioannidis, Rubin**

- Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack to Break WEP
http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/wep_attack.pdf